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NOTES
PROFILES,  SYNDROMES,  AND  THE  RULE  405
PROBLEM:  ADDRESSING  A  FORM  OF
DISGUISED  CHARACTER  UNDER  THE
FEDERAL  RULES  OF  EVIDENCE
Michael D. Claus*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that after years of meticulous research, a team of doc-
tors, scientists, and criminologists publish a study of convicted mur-
derers.  The team has concluded that the vast majority of murderers
have certain traits in common.  They include personality traits—such
as aggression, and environmental traits—such as access to a weapon,
and abusive parents.  The team of experts further declares that these
traits so frequently reoccur among convicted murderers, they can pre-
dict with confidence that an aggressive person with access to a weapon
and abusive parents is significantly more likely to murder than the rest
of the population.  The study receives universal acclaim within the sci-
entific community and is immediately included in every respected
treatise on the subject.  Prosecutors throughout the country are eager
to bring a homicide case to trial and try out the new “Convicted Mur-
derer Profile.”  Trial judges, meanwhile, struggle with the question: to
what extent should this evidence be admissible against a defendant
who “fits the profile”?
 2012 Michael D. Claus.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Notre Dame Law School.  I would like to
thank Professor J. Eric Smithburn for his guidance, Joseph R. Ganahl and Brian
Tweedie for their helpful editing, and Professor Michael C. Murphy, Chuck Claus,
and Kerry Claus for their support.
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Profile and syndrome evidence shows a correlation between cer-
tain traits or characteristics and particular forms of behavior.1  After
compiling data from numerous cases, experts then attempt to “con-
struct a diagnostic or predictive ‘profile’ for such behavior.”2  Profile
and syndrome evidence invites the inference that individuals who fit a
profile or possess a syndrome are likely to have acted in a certain way.
Courts differ greatly in their attempts to define whether profile
and syndrome evidence should be admissible, and if so, under what
theory of evidence.3  The Federal Rules of Evidence liberally admit
any relevant evidence, unless the Constitution, a statute, or a different
rule directs otherwise.4  “Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evi-
dence.”5  Intuitively, most people would likely accept a “Convicted
Murderer Profile” as at least moderately predictive of behavior, satisfy-
ing the “any tendency” standard of Rule 401.  Furthermore, the uni-
versal recognition in the scientific community of the Profile would
satisfy Federal Rules 7026 and 703,7 governing expert testimony.
Meeting these standards, the majority of jurisdictions today would
conclude by examining the evidence under Rule 403,8 and admit the
1 See EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, PRACTITIONER’S TREA-
TISE § 206, at 884 (6th ed. 1984).
2 Id.
3 See infra Part II.
4 FED. R. EVID. 402 (“Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following
provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; these rules; or
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.  Irrelevant evidence is not
admissible.”).
5 Id. 401(a) (emphasis added).
6 Id. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a)
the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is
based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case.”).
7 Id. 703 (“An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the
expert has been made aware of or personally observed.  If experts in the particular
field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on
the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.  But if the
facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may
disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the
opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”).
8 Id. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.”).
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“Convicted Murderer Profile” if the court determined that the proba-
tive value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice.9
However, other Federal Rules lurk in the background to compli-
cate the inquiry.  First, Rule 404’s prohibition against using character
evidence to prove conduct seeks to limit the jury from drawing the
inference that character traits and past conduct predict present behav-
ior.10  Even an entirely accurate “Convicted Murderer Profile” raises
serious concerns that the defendant will not receive a fair trial.  The
Convicted Murderer Profile invites the jury to conclude that because
this defendant fits the profile, he or she is more likely to have commit-
ted the crime.  Rule 404 seeks to prevent the jury from drawing pre-
cisely this “forbidden inference.”
Rule 404(a)(1) declares that “[e]vidence of a person’s character
or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occa-
sion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.”  If
one defines fitting a profile or possessing a syndrome11 as “character”
or a “character trait,”12 the Rule should operate to exclude the evi-
dence, unless an exception to Rule 404 applies.
When dealing with profile and syndrome evidence, the majority
of jurisdictions attempt to mitigate Rule 404 concerns by restricting
the admissibility of such evidence as proof of substantive guilt, while
generally allowing it for other purposes, such as explaining conduct.13
That is, courts focus exclusively on the purpose of the evidence, rather
than generally prohibiting it because of the forbidden inference it
9 As discussed below, most courts would probably exclude the evidence if used to
suggest the defendant’s guilt or innocence.
10 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (“Evidence of a person’s character or character trait is
not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance
with the character or trait.”); id. 404(b)(1) (“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act
is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”).
11 This Note, like most commentaries, uses the terms “profile” and “syndrome”
interchangeably, unless discussing a specific profile or syndrome, e.g., “Battered
Woman Syndrome.”
12 This assumption is admittedly not self-evident.  For one thing, there is no com-
prehensive definition of “character” in the Federal Rules.  Further, courts inconsis-
tently define and apply the doctrine. See Barrett J. Anderson, Note, Recognizing
Character: A New Perspective on Character Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912, 1914 (2012)
(“Unfortunately, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not define character, and worse
still, there is no judicially manageable definition of character for courts to apply when
the admissibility of evidence turns on this determination.”) (footnote omitted). How-
ever, if one focuses on the inference which such evidence invites, profile and syn-
drome evidence can and should be labeled character evidence.
13 See infra Part I and III.
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invites.  Under the majority view, the “Convicted Murderer Profile”
would probably be excluded to prove the defendant’s guilt.14  How-
ever, expert testimony regarding other forms of profile and syndrome
evidence which invite an inference about an alleged victim’s behavior
are routinely admitted in trial courts.  For instance, Rape Trauma Syn-
drome15 evidence—suggesting that, because many rape victims delay
reporting an assault, the alleged victim in this case probably delayed—
is often found admissible.  By ignoring the forbidden inference and
focusing solely on the purpose for which the evidence is offered,
courts admit disguised character evidence through expert witnesses.
This Note argues that the prohibition against character evidence
should be promoted from the background of the trial court’s analysis
of profiles and syndromes to the forefront.  The better approach is to
acknowledge that such evidence invites the forbidden inference, and
determine its admissibility accordingly.  Doing so requires the trial
court to consider Rule 404 and its exceptions.  Such analysis may well
lead to admission of the evidence.  I do not seek to argue normatively
whether profile and syndrome evidence is valuable or unduly prejudi-
cial.16  I do maintain, however, that such evidence raises an inference
which is generally prohibited under the Federal Rules of Evidence,17
and should be analyzed accordingly.
That said, the existing framework of the Federal Rules is ill-
equipped to handle profile and syndrome evidence.  Rule 405 pro-
vides the acceptable methods of proving character when an exception
to the general prohibition applies.  It directs that in the rare instances
when character evidence is admissible, “it may be proved by testimony
about the person’s reputation or by testimony in the form of an opin-
ion.”18  Rule 405 seems to envision character evidence in the form of
opinion and reputation testimony provided by a lay character witness.
14 See Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of
a Skeptic, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 867, 882 n.66 (2005) (“It must be noted that profile
evidence offered by the prosecution regarding the defendant (unlike syndrome evi-
dence regarding the victim) is generally not admissible, as it is viewed as unreliable
and runs afoul of the character evidence prohibition against painting the defendant
as a particular ‘criminal-type.’”).
15 See infra Part I.
16 Others have effectively taken up this task. See, e.g., Brodin, supra note 14, at R
870; David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of
Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 70 (1997); James Aaron George, Note, Offender Profiling
and Expert Testimony: Scientifically Valid or Glorified Results?, 61 VAND. L. REV. 221, 224
(2008).
17 As well as under the corresponding state rules.
18 FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
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However, profile and syndrome evidence is presented by expert wit-
nesses.19  I have termed this anomaly the “Rule 405 problem.”
The Rule 405 problem can be summarized as follows:
(1) Profile and syndrome evidence is presented by expert witnesses.
(2) Profile and syndrome evidence raises a character inference.
(3) Character evidence must be presented by lay witnesses.
Thus, while profile and syndrome evidence may be authorized by
the exceptions of Rule 404, such as when a criminal defendant offers
evidence of his own character trait, there is no proper method to
introduce it under Rule 405.
In Part I of this Note, I discuss some common and controversial
profiles and syndromes introduced in trial courts across the country.20
After briefly outlining the standards governing the prohibition of
character evidence in Part II, I then introduce the Rule 405 problem.
Part III examines the various approaches among federal and state
courts in analyzing profile and syndrome evidence.  Finally, in Part IV,
I offer some potential solutions to the vexing problem of how to prop-
erly introduce profile and syndrome evidence under the existing
framework of the Federal Rules.
Disguised character evidence should not be admissible simply
because it is presented by an expert.  By ignoring the character infer-
ence that profile and syndrome evidence invites, courts are able to
bypass the general restrictions of Rule 404 and the methodology
problems of Rule 405.  While perhaps convenient, this Note argues
that the prevailing practice diminishes the prohibition against charac-
ter evidence.  Ideally, a new rule would directly address profile and
syndrome evidence and provide acceptable methods of presenting it.
At the very least, courts should reexamine their approach to profile
and syndrome evidence under the current Rules to ensure that char-
acter evidence is presented only when truly authorized.
19 Id. 701(c) (declaring that opinion testimony by a lay witness may “not [be]
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” (emphasis added)).
20 The introduction of profile and syndrome evidence is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon, becoming prominent in the late twentieth century.  For instance, the first
time the Supreme Court addressed the use of drug courier profile evidence was in
1980 in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), and the first time it addressed
Battered Woman Syndrome evidence was in 1984 in Moran v. Ohio, 469 U.S. 948
(1984) (mem.) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Mark J. Kadish, The Drug Courier Profile:
In Planes, Trains, and Automobiles; and Now in the Jury Box, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 754
(1997).
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I. PROFILES AND SYNDROMES
Psychologists and other experts have developed numerous
profiles and syndromes varying considerably in subject matter.  Each
profile presupposes, first, that a profile of characteristics or traits can
be constructed based on a collection of data, and secondly, that the
profile can be used to predict behavior.21  The use of some syndrome
evidence, such as the Battered Woman Syndrome, has become com-
monplace at trial.22  Such evidence is often used to explain a defen-
dant, victim, or witness’s behavior.23  More problematic, at least in a
majority of jurisdictions, are profiles and syndromes that focus on the
probable guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant.  This evidence
“consists of a compilation of otherwise innocent characteristics, cou-
pled with an implicit invitation to infer criminal conduct from those
characteristics.”24  For many courts, evidence offered for this purpose
is too prejudicial to admit against the defendant.25
A full examination of every profile and syndrome that has been
introduced in American courts is not feasible.  Instead, five of the
most common or controversial forms of such evidence are briefly sum-
marized below.
A. Battered Woman Syndrome
Battered Woman Syndrome evidence is generally offered by
female criminal defendants to explain violent acts, often in conjunc-
tion with a self-defense argument.26  Women who kill their husbands
or partners maintain they have been driven to such dire acts by
extended periods—even years and decades—of physical and psycho-
logical abuse.27  Furthermore, defendants use Battered Woman Syn-
21 See CLEARY ET AL., supra note 1, at 885. R
22 See Erin M. Masson, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert or Opinion Evidence of
Battered-Woman Syndrome on Issue of Self- Defense, 58 A.L.R. 5th 749, 761 (1998) (noting
that the vast majority of jurisdictions admit Battered Woman Syndrome or similar
evidence to support a self-defense claim).
23 See, e.g., United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 419 (8th Cir. 1987).
24 Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 56–57 (Wyo. 1999).
25 See, e.g., State v. McMillan, 590 N.E.2d 23, 32 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
26 See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 487 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (finding
Battered Spouse Syndrome evidence admissible to support a self-defense plea); see
also United States v. Marenghi, 893 F. Supp. 85, 94-95 (D. Me. 1995) (finding that
Battered Woman Syndrome evidence may be admissible to support a defense of
duress).
27 See Moran v. Ohio, 469 U.S. 948, 950 (1984) (mem.) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“Descriptions of this syndrome emphasize the husband’s repeated and violent beat-
ings and the wife’s dependency—economic and emotional—that make it practically
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drome evidence to explain their failure to leave an abusive
relationship or other behavior which otherwise may seem irrational to
a jury.28  Such evidence is not typically used to suggest the guilt or
innocence of the woman.  Instead, it is used to bolster a self-defense
argument or explain otherwise irrational behavior.29
According to Battered Woman Syndrome studies, a pattern can
be seen throughout abusive relationships.30  The relationships
between female victims and their abusive partners are cyclical.31  First
tension builds between the batterer and the woman, which eventually
culminates in violence against the victim.  The batterer then makes a
seemingly sincere apology, commencing a period of tranquility.
Finally, the cycle restarts and the abuse resumes.32
Each battered woman experiences similar feelings of helpless-
ness, desperation, depression, passivity, and extreme anxiety.33  Psy-
chologists have identified four general characteristics of the
syndrome:
(1) The woman believes that the violence was or is her fault.
impossible for her to leave. When faced with an immediate threat, victims may be
driven to take the lives of their mates as the only possible method of escaping the
threat.”).
28 See, e.g., State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (Wash. 1984) (“[E]xpert testimony
explaining why a person suffering from the battered woman syndrome would not
leave her mate, would not inform police or friends, and would fear increased aggres-
sion against herself would be helpful to a jury in understanding a phenomenon not
within the competence of an ordinary lay person.”).
29 See Brodin, supra note 14, at 869 (“Battered woman syndrome evidence may R
also be offered by the defense for the purpose of establishing that the defendant
believed she was in imminent danger, even though the objective circumstances posed
no apparent immediate threat justifying self-defense (as where the abuser is killed in
his sleep).”).
30 See generally LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979) (identifying the
cycle of violence and learned helplessness as typical patterns in an abusive
relationship).
31 Matthew P. Hawes, Removing the Roadblocks to Successful Domestic Violence Prosecu-
tions: Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome in Ohio, 53
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 133, 137 (2005) (“The battering relationship itself is often described
as cyclical in nature, with three distinct phases: tension building, confrontation, and
contrition.  During the ‘tension building’ phase, the woman is generally compliant,
often feeling as though she deserves the abuse.  Once the tension reaches a boiling
point, the batterer will erupt uncontrollably, committing a violent act.  Next, in an
abrupt about-face, the abuser will exhibit seemingly intense love and affection
towards his victim.  The victimized women are then led to believe that the violence
was an isolated incident and that it will not continue.” (footnotes omitted)).
32 Id.
33 See id.
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(2) The woman has an inability to place responsibility for the vio-
lence elsewhere.
(3) The woman fears for her life and/or her children’s lives.
(4) The woman has an irrational belief that the abuser is omnipres-
ent and omniscient.34
Eventually, years of frustration and “learned helplessness”35 leave
the victim no other option but to lash out against the batterer.36
B. Rape Trauma Syndrome
Some psychologists argue that victims of rape display certain
behaviors and coping mechanisms, many of which are similar to those
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.37  The extensive list
includes emotional numbing, anxiety, depression, physical and sexual
problems, and avoidance of reminders of the assault.38  Courts some-
times admit evidence that the victim displays such characteristics as
proof of the act—that is, that he or she was indeed raped.39  Similarly,
Rape Trauma Syndrome evidence is also used by prosecutors to
negate a defense of consent.40
34 See BRENT E. TURVEY & WAYNE PETHERICK, FORENSIC VICTIMOLOGY 241 (2009).
35 WALKER, supra note 30, at 45–54. R
36 Perhaps the most famous attempted use of Battered Woman Syndrome evi-
dence was in the trial of Elisabeth “Betty” Broderick in the early 1990s.  Broderick was
tried for the murder of her ex-husband and his new wife Linda Kolkena.  Broderick
claimed she was driven to kill by her husband’s psychological abuse and affair with a
younger woman.  After her first trial resulted in a hung jury, Broderick was convicted
on two counts of second-degree murder.  Despite considerable evidence against her,
Broderick attributes the verdict, in part, to the judge’s exclusion of her expert witness
who would have testified on Battered Woman Syndrome. See MARJORIE COHN &
DAVID DOW, CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM 51 (2011); CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE
REASONABLE MAN 48–49 (2003).
37 See 12 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 401, 410–11 (1991).
38 Id. at 413–30.
39 See, e.g., State v. McQuillen, 689 P.2d 822, 829 (Kan. 1984) (permitting an
expert to testify “that the patient/victim does possess and exhibit the emotional and
psychological trauma consistent with rape trauma syndrome”). But see People v. Bled-
soe, 681 P.2d 291, 301 (Cal. 1984) (denying admissibility of expert testimony related
to rape trauma syndrome); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982)
(again, denying admissibility of expert testimony related to rape trauma syndrome);
Developments in the Law: Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1481, 1500 (1995) (outlining courts’ argument that expert testimony concerning
rape trauma syndrome is too subjective).
40 See CLEARY ET AL., supra note 1, at 886. R
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More commonly, courts admit such evidence to explain a victim’s
behavior.41  In this case, the evidence is offered to rehabilitate the wit-
ness’s testimony, rather than prove the victim was raped.  For
instance, victims often delay reporting a rape.42  Rape Trauma Syn-
drome evidence is offered to show that this behavior is normal.43
When admitted, the court reasons that the syndrome evidence will
assist in dispelling preconceived notions the jury may have about how
a rape victim would act.44
C. Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
The primary purpose of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome evidence is to explain a child victim’s actions that may seem
to hurt the child’s credibility.45  Children’s testimony presents particu-
larly difficult issues for prosecutors46 because child witnesses are often
confused and nervous, and sometimes present inconsistent versions of
the events.47  Experts are called to testify regarding characteristics
commonly observed in sexually abused children including: “(1)
secrecy; (2) helplessness; (3) entrapment and accommodation; (4)
delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and (5) retrac-
41 See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 136–39 (N.Y. 1990) (admitting
expert testimony concerning rape trauma syndrome); Brodin, supra note 14, at 914 R
(discussing the variable nature of victims’ behaviors that courts must consider when
admitting expert testimony related to rape trauma syndrome).
42 See JOHN O. SAVINO ET. AL, RAPE INVESTIGATION HANDBOOK 53 (2d ed. 2011).
43 See Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric Label-
ing, and Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1271, 1274 (1994).
44 See, e.g., Taylor, 552 N.E.2d at 138 (allowing Rape Trauma Syndrome evidence
to demonstrate how a victim would act after an attack); People v. Bennett, 593 N.E.2d
279, 284 (N.Y. 1992) (noting that it would allow Rape Trauma Syndrome evidence to
demonstrate how a victim would act during an attack if the evidence has the requisite
scientific basis, and its potential value outweighs the possibility of undue prejudice to
defendant or does not interfere with the jury’s province to determine credibility.).
45 See Rosemary L. Flint, Note, Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Admissi-
bility Requirements, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 171, 194 (1995) (“With appropriate restrictions,
CSAAS can be used to explain unusual behaviors of child sexual abuse victims, help-
ing jurors to make informed decisions regarding the credibility of the victims’
testimony.”).
46 Id. at 179 (“Unlike other complainants, the child sexual abuse victim is gener-
ally not forceful, convincing, nor consistent in her allegations.” (quoting Lisa R.
Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2027, 2028 (1994))).
47 Id.
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tion.”48  This syndrome evidence is typically admitted to rebut the
inference that a victim is lying because the child delayed reporting the
incident, changed his or her story multiple times, or seemingly accom-
modated the abuser.49  More controversially, some courts have admit-
ted the evidence to prove the underlying offense.50
D. Battering Parent Syndrome / Profile
The Battering Parent Syndrome or Profile is a composite of cer-
tain characteristics common among adults who batter their children.
Profile characteristics typically include “low self esteem, poor impulse
control, low empathy, low frustration tolerance, [and] inadequate
knowledge of basic child development and parenting skills,” as well as
evidence that the alleged abuser was neglected or abused himself as a
child, is under financial or other stress, or asks the children for sup-
port that the adult should be providing to the child.51  The profile
may be used either by the prosecution, to show that the defendant fits
the composite, or by the defense, to prove the incompatibility of a
defendant’s profile with that of the typical child abuser.52
E. Drug Courier Profiles
Drug courier profiles are primarily used by Drug Enforcement
Agency agents as investigative tools to identify suspected drug traffick-
ers.53  The profiles consist of “a list of identifying characteristics or
behaviors that law enforcement officials associate with drug couri-
48 See Dara Loren Steele, Note, Expert Testimony: Seeking an Appropriate Admissibility
Standard for Behavioral Science in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 48 DUKE L.J. 933,
943–44 (1999).
49 See Flint, supra note 45, at 180. See also, State v. Schnabel, 952 A.2d 452, 462 R
(N.J. 2008) (recognizing that CSAAS evidence can help explain actions exhibited by
victims that might otherwise undermine their credibility); State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196,
1201 (N.J. 1993) (explaining that “this type of testimony has an important nonsub-
stantive purpose of which the majority of courts approve. It can be used on rebuttal
‘to rehabilitate’ the victim’s testimony when the defense asserts that the child’s delay
in reporting the abuse and recanting of the story indicate that the child is unworthy
of belief.”).
50 See CLEARY ET AL., supra note 1, at 887. R
51 See David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to
the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REV.
19, 53 (1987).
52 Id. at 53, 55.
53 Kadish, supra note 20, at 748 n.1. R
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ers.”54  Though there is no single, nationally recognized profile,55
agents look to a number of factors, including; “(1) Reservations and
Ticket Purchases; (2) Airports and Flights; (3) Nervousness and Asso-
ciated Behavior; (4) Significance of Luggage; (5) Companions (Trav-
eled With or Picked Up By); (6) Personal Characteristics; and (7)
Miscellany.”56  As almost any traveler behavior could fall under these
categories, DEA agents’ use of the profiles has been sharply
criticized.57
Use of drug courier profile in the courtroom is no less controver-
sial.58  In a majority of jurisdictions, drug courier profile evidence is
inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt.59  However, such evi-
dence is sometimes admitted: “(1) as background material to explain
police conduct in arresting the accused; (2) as foundation for police
expert opinions; (3) as background material to explain the modus
operandi of the drug trade; and (4) as rebuttal evidence against the
accused.”60
II. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS AND THE RULE 405 PROBLEM
A. The Prohibition Against Character Evidence
Evidentiary character refers to a person’s general disposition or a
general trait, such as honesty, chastity, violent temperament, or peace-
fulness.61  Character evidence invites the factfinder to draw an infer-
ence about someone’s actions based on that person’s general
character.  The use of character evidence to prove conduct—or cir-
cumstantial use of character62—is generally prohibited in the federal
courts under Rule 404 and in state courts under the corresponding
state rules.63  Rule 404(a) asserts that “[e]vidence of a person’s char-
54 Id. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 525 n.6, (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (“A ‘profile’ is, in effect, the collective or distilled experience of narcotics
officers concerning characteristics repeatedly seen in drug smugglers.”).
55 Kadish, supra note 20, at 748. R
56 Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: “All Seems Infected That Th’ Infected
Spy, As All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic’d Eye”, 65 N.C. L. REV. 417, 439 (1987)
57 See generally id. (arguing that the use of profile evidence is inconsistent and is
inadequately supported by empirical evidence).
58 See generally Kadish, supra note 20, at 762, 785 (arguing that the use of profile R
evidence violates evidentiary rules and denies due process rights to the accused).
59 Id. at 762.
60 Id. at 760–61.
61 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 404.02 (2d ed. 2011).
62 See CLEARY ET AL., supra note 1, at 748. R
63 FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
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acter or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait,”64
although certain exceptions apply.65
Two primary justifications for the prohibition against character
evidence in American trials have developed and endured.  First, the
doctrine attempts to ensure that jurors will not give undue weight to
evidence of someone’s character.66  Jurors tend to erroneously con-
sider personality traits as more predictive of individual behavior than
they actually are.67  Further, to the extent that a general character
trait does predict behavior, it may distract the jury from other, more
probative evidence.68  “The inquiry is not rejected because character
is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury
and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular
charge.”69  If evidence of character is kept from the jury, the forbid-
den inference cannot be drawn.
Just as important, the second rationale for the prohibition against
character pervades the American justice system: in short, a defendant
stands trial for his actions, not his disposition.70  Indeed, “[i]t is funda-
mental to American jurisprudence that ‘a defendant must be tried for
what he did, not for who he is.’”71  Without the doctrine, a jury might
punish a defendant for his bad character or previous actions, even if
the evidence does not support a guilty verdict in the case at hand.72
Similarly, the jury may feel justified in passing judgment based on the
defendant’s prior actions, rather than the matter before it.
The exceptions to the general prohibition against character evi-
dence apply only in criminal matters or in rare civil cases when “char-
64 Id. 404(a)(1).
65 Id. 404(a)(2)–(3).
66 See Barrett J. Anderson, Note, Recognizing Character: A New Perspective on Charac-
ter Evidence, 121 Yale L.J. 1912, 1928–29 (2012).
67 See CLEARY ET AL., supra note 1, at 743. R
68 See Anderson, supra note 66, at 1928–29 (“[I]f jurors are exposed to character R
evidence, they are more likely to believe that the individual in question acted in con-
formity with that character, blinding them to the impact of other evidence.”).
69 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948).
70 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5232 (1978) (“[T]he rule barring propensity evidence supports one of
the fundamental policies of our criminal law; that persons are to be punished for
what they have done, not for what they are.”).
71 United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting United
States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977)).
72 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 194, at 233 (1904).
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acter is in issue.”73  First, a criminal defendant may offer evidence of
his own pertinent trait, such as truthfulness, peacefulness, or the like.
If the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may rebut it with evidence
attacking the defendant’s character on the same trait.74  That is, a
defendant’s use of character evidence “opens the door” to the prose-
cution’s use of character evidence against the defendant on that same
trait.75  Second, a defendant may also offer evidence of an alleged vic-
tim’s pertinent trait, again opening the door to the prosecution to
offer evidence against the defendant of that same trait.76  A third,
related exception applies only to homicide cases.  There, the prosecu-
tor may rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor with evi-
dence of the victim’s character trait of peacefulness.77  Finally, Rules
607 through 609 govern the admissibility of the evidence of a witness’s
character.78  When attacking a witness’s character, the evidence is lim-
ited to matters pertaining to the witness’s character for truthfulness.79
The use of evidence of a past crime, wrong, or other act is gov-
erned by Rule 404(b).  “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the charac-
ter.”80  The Rules are concerned with the inference that because
someone committed bad acts in the past, he is likely to have commit-
ted the bad act for which he is currently on trial.  The rule seeks to
protect the accused against unfair prejudice81 and prevent the jury
from drawing a “bad man” inference about a party.
73 See Ginter v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 576 F. Supp. 627, 630 (E.D. Ky.
1984) (“It seems beyond peradventure of doubt that the drafters of [Rule 404(a)]
explicitly intended that all character evidence, except where ‘character is at issue’ was
to be excluded.”).
74 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A) (“[A] defendant may offer evidence of the defen-
dant’s pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evi-
dence to rebut it.”).
75 Id.
76 Id. 404(a)(2)(B) (“[S]ubject to the limitations in Rule 412, a defendant may
offer evidence of an alleged victim’s pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted,
the prosecutor may: (i) offer evidence to rebut it; and (ii) offer evidence of the defen-
dant’s same trait.”).
77 Id. 404(a)(2)(C) (“[I]n a homicide case, the prosecutor may offer evidence of
the alleged victim’s trait of peacefulness to rebut evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor.”).
78 See id. 607–609.
79 Id.
80 FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
81 See MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 190, at 447 (Edward
W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-2\NDL209.txt unknown Seq: 14 28-JAN-13 16:59
986 notre dame law review [vol. 88:2
Despite the Rule’s strong exclusionary language, evidence of
prior bad acts is not totally barred.  Evidence of prior bad acts “may be
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or
lack of accident.”82  When admitted, there is something about the
prior bad act—typically similarity in mode or circumstances—which is
particularly probative of what occurred in the current case.83  In such
cases, the judge will usually give a limiting instruction admonishing
the jury to consider the evidence only for its non-character purpose.84
Of course, a jury may have difficulty drawing the distinction.85  If the
proponent of the evidence can characterize “bad acts” as being
offered for a non-character purpose, the effect can be devastating.
Trials are won and lost on such characterizations.86
The profiles and syndromes discussed in Part I all raise character
inferences in varying degrees.  For instance, Battering Parent Profile
evidence provided by prosecutors overtly suggests that because the
accused fits the profile, he is likely to have committed the crime.  Pro-
file and syndrome evidence used in this manner is particularly troub-
ling, given the backdrop and justifications for the prohibition against
82 FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). See also FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s
notes (1991 amendments) (“Rule 404(b) has emerged as one of the most cited Rules
in the Rules of Evidence.”).
83 See, e.g., United States v. Espinosa, No. 92-50564, 1993 WL 300600, at *1 (9th
Cir. July 21, 1993).  There the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess
cocaine with intent to distribute. Id.  At trial the Court admitted evidence of his prior
convictions for smuggling marijuana and possession of marijuana with intent to dis-
tribute. Id.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision. Id. at *2.  Because “[b]oth
offenses involved enormous quantities of drugs which originated in Columbia, the use
of tractor-trailers for transportation, and the disguising of loads as legitimate cargo,”
the prior conviction for smuggling marijuana was similar to the current offense. Id. at
*1.  Thus, the prosecution was permitted to use his prior convictions for the purpose
of proving the defendant’s knowledge and intent. Id. at *2.
84 In Espinosa, the Court noted that “the prejudicial effect of the introduction of
the prior drug conviction was limited by the district court’s instruction to the jury that
it was not to consider the evidence for any other purpose but to show motive, oppor-
tunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or acci-
dent.” Id. at *2.
85 See Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule
404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 250 (2005) (“The usual limiting instruction certainly
makes the cold-type record look better to a reviewing court, but the efficacy of such
an instruction has been questioned by professors and judges for decades.”).
86 See id. at 243 (“The jury will reason from the proved act of uncharged miscon-
duct that it is more likely that the accused committed the crime charged because the
accused was predisposed to commit that type of criminal act.  The court, to be sure,
cautions the jury against doing so, but very few commentators believe that such
instructions really curb the jury’s common-sense use of uncharged misconduct.”).
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character evidence.  But even when used by the defendant to show
that he does not fit the profile and is thus unlikely to have committed
the crime, the effect may be less prejudicial, but the character infer-
ence remains.87  Similarly, drug courier profiles, often used to explain
a DEA agent’s actions in making an arrest, discreetly invite the jury to
conclude that the accused is a drug trafficker because he fits the pro-
file.  Even Battered Woman Syndrome evidence explaining victim
behavior can also imply to the jury that the batterer is probably typical
of other batterers—precisely the sort of conclusion Rule 404 seeks to
limit.88
As discussed in greater detail in Part III, few courts acknowledge
that profile and syndrome evidence raise a character inference under
either Rule 404(a) or 404(b).  The majority of decisions do not explic-
itly reject the notion—they unfortunately do not address it or brush it
aside.89  The decision to ignore character inferences is troubling in a
system which seeks to punish a defendant based on the evidence
presented, not his disposition or prior bad acts.  But even when the
evidence is presented by a criminal defendant on his own behalf, the
inference is raised in contravention of Rule 404(a)(1).
B. Standards Governing Expert Testimony
Rule 701 declares that opinion testimony by a lay witness may not
be based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.90
When admissible, profile or syndrome evidence is presented by an
87 Importantly, Rule 404(a)(1) makes no distinction between evidence used
against the defendant and others.  The general prohibition on character evidence in
Rule 404(a)(1) states that “Evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not
admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
the character or trait.” (emphasis added).  By the clear text of the rule, the use of
character evidence generally is prohibited against (or by) anyone, not just a criminal
defendant.
88 While it is true that character evidence allows witnesses to generalize on the
basis of the defendant’s past acts to support an inference of the defendant’s present
conduct, and profile evidence, conversely, often involves generalizations based on the
past acts of third parties, see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, at § 5233 n.53.2, the R
distinction is not particularly meaningful.  In both cases, the jury is invited to infer
that the person acted in conformity with a character trait.
89 See, e.g., State v. Loss, 204 N.W.2d 404, 409 (Minn. 1973) (“The prosecution
properly presented to the jury the psychological framework which constitutes a bat-
tering parent.  It did not attempt to point the finger of accusation at defendant as a
battering parent by its medical testimony.  Rather, it presented sufficient evidence
from which the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant fit one of the psycho-
logical patterns of a battering parent.”).
90 See FED. R. EVID. 701(c).
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expert witness.91  Because it requires scientific, technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge, such evidence falls within the purview of Rule
702.92
Three Supreme Court decisions interpreting Rule 702 define the
landscape for the admissibility of expert testimony.  The “Daubert Tril-
ogy” of cases, in particular the decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals93 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,94 prescribe the trial
judge’s gate-keeping function of excluding unreliable expert
testimony.95
In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that Rule 702 requires that
an expert witness testify to reliable scientific knowledge.96  Further-
more, the information given by an expert witness must assist the trier
of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.97  In other words,
the information must be helpful to the jury or judge.  Thus, testimony
based on unproven science or speculation should be filtered by the
trial judge.98
The Court then articulated five factors to guide trial judges in
making their preliminary “helpfulness” inquiry.  They include (1)
whether the theory or technique can be, or has been, tested;99 (2)
91 See, e.g., Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1239–40 (8th Cir. 1991).
92 “A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.”
FED. R. EVID. 702.
93 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
94 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
95 The third case, General Electric v. Joiner, holds that the standard of review on
appeal for the trial court’s decision to admit or deny expert testimony is “abuse of
discretion.”  522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997).
96 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (the Rules of Evidence—especially Rule 702—do
assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a
reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on
scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.”).
97 Id. at 592.
98 Id. at 589.  The Court reiterated the filtering role of the trial judge who “must
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant,
but reliable.” Id.
99 Id. at 593.
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whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication;100 (3)
the known or potential error rate;101 (4) the existence of standards
controlling the technique’s operation;102 and (5) general acceptance
of the method or technique within the scientific community.103  The
Court further stressed that the five factors were not an exhaustive list.
To the contrary, the Court emphasized that the inquiry is flexible.  An
expert’s testimony need not meet all of the factors—or even any of
the factors—to be admitted.104  If the trial judge finds that the testi-
mony rests on an adequate foundation of scientific reliability—
through the listed factors or otherwise—and is relevant, such testi-
mony should be admitted.
The trial judge’s gatekeeping role is not limited to scientific evi-
dence. In Kuhmo, the Court clarified its position, holding that the
text of Rule 702 “makes no relevant distinction between ‘scientific’
knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge.”105  In
short, Daubert applies to all expert testimony, whether based on scien-
tific principles or non-scientific knowledge, experience, or training.
For any proposed expert, the trial judge must serve as a gatekeeper to
ensure the evidence he or she will present is reliable and relevant.106
The Daubert factors may be helpful in this task, but may not apply in
every instance.
Experts traditionally include engineers, scientists, doctors, and
other professionals.  Nevertheless, formal training and education is
not a prerequisite to testifying as an expert.107  The witness must sim-
ply possess specialized knowledge which is helpful to the trier of
fact.108  This standard is fact-specific and varies depending on the sub-
ject matter.109  Even so, courts liberally allow expert witnesses to testify
and often leave any perceived lack of qualifications to weight rather
than admissibility.110
100 Id.
101 Id. at 594.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 593 (“[W]e do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.”).
105 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
106 Id. at 152.
107 See Mulholland v. DEC Int’l Corp., 443 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Mich. 1989) (“It is
perhaps tempting to equate the word ‘expert’ with the notion of a licensed profes-
sional. However, there is no basis for doing so in the text of [Rule 702].”).
108 FED R. EVID. 702(a).
109 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 137.
110 See, e.g., Vision I Homeowners Ass’n v. Aspen Specialty Ins. Co., 674 F. Supp. 2d
1321, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (“The qualification standard for expert testimony is ‘not
stringent,’ and ‘so long as the expert is minimally qualified, objections to the level of
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Generally, profile and syndrome evidence has been found to sat-
isfy Daubert.  For instance, the defendant in United States v. Simmons111
challenged the government’s use of Rape Trauma Syndrome evidence
to explain a victim’s behavior.112  The court rejected the argument
that the expert’s evidence was unreliable because it was “developed
for therapeutic, rather than forensic, purposes.”113  The court held
that Daubert encompasses other indicia of reliability beyond scientific
methods, “including professional experience, education, training, and
observations.”114  Similarly, Battered Woman Syndrome generally has
been accepted by courts as helpful in assisting the factfinder.115
Indeed, academic commentators are far more critical than the courts
regarding the reliability of such evidence.116
C. The Rule 405 Problem
Rule 404 governs when character evidence is admissible; Rule 405
governs how it is proved.  Rule 405 identifies three methods of proving
character.  The first method is through witnesses testifying as to the
person’s reputation for a certain trait within the community.117  Sec-
ond, a witness with personal knowledge of the person can testify as to
her opinion on that person’s pertinent character trait.118  Finally, a
witness can testify about specific instances of the person’s conduct
the expert’s expertise [go] to credibility and weight, not admissibility.’” (quoting Kil-
patrick v. Breg, Inc., No. 08-10052-CIV, 2009 WL 2058384 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2009))).
111 470 F.3d 1115 (5th Cir. 2006).
112 Id. at 1123–24.
113 Id. at 1122.
114 Id. at 1123.
115 See, e.g., State v. McMillan, 590 N.E.2d 23, 32 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (citing State
v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Ohio 1990)).
116 See, e.g., David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the
Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67 (1997).  The authors argue that Lenore Walker’s
second book on Battered Woman Syndrome “contains little more than a patchwork of
pseudo-scientific methods employed to confirm a hypothesis that its author and par-
ticipating researchers never seriously doubted.  Indeed, the 1984 book would provide
an excellent case study for . . . how not to conduct empirical research.” Id. at 68
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); see also McMillan, 590 N.E.2d at 32 (“Most
writers on the subject of sexual abuse agree that there are no common characteristics
sufficient to constitute a profile of sexual abusers.”).
117 FED. R. EVID. 405(a) (“When evidence of a person’s character or character trait
is admissible, it may be proved by testimony about the person’s reputation or by testi-
mony in the form of an opinion.”).
118 Id.
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from which the trier of fact can infer character, but only when charac-
ter is “in issue.”119
Profile and syndrome evidence is presented by expert wit-
nesses.120  Such evidence does not fit within any of three methods of
proving character—by reputation, opinion, and specific instances of
conduct.  Instead, it requires scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge of the profile or syndrome and thus falls under the pur-
view of Rule 702.  Assuming profile and syndrome evidence does raise
a character inference, there is no adequate method of offering it
under Rule 405.
The differing approaches taken by courts in Indiana and Iowa
demonstrate the struggle facing trial courts in dealing with the Rule
405 problem.121  The Indiana Supreme Court has declared that
“expert opinion, whether based on a personality profile or not, is
[not] an appropriate way to prove a defendant’s character for a partic-
ular trait.”122  It further stated the general rule that, in Indiana, the
only way to prove character is through reputation testimony.123
Despite this pronouncement, the court did not—and never has—
announced an outright prohibition against the use of profile and syn-
drome evidence.
In an Iowa sexual assault trial, an expert would have testified that
the defendant did not fit the psychological profile of a child
molester.124  The Iowa Supreme Court noted that character evidence
would ordinarily be “offered through the testimony of laypersons in
the community who are aware of the defendant’s ‘real’ character
either by direct knowledge or reputation.”125  After wrestling with vari-
ous standards courts use to analyze such evidence, the court declared
119 Id. 405(b) (“When a person’s character or character trait is an essential ele-
ment of a charge, claim, or defense, the character or trait may also be proved by
relevant specific instances of the person’s conduct.”).
120 See infra Part III.B.
121 Their approaches differ in spite of the fact that both Iowa and Indiana have
adopted evidence codes based on the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Cornell U. Law
Sch. Legal Info. Inst., Uniform Rules of Evidence Locator, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
LOCATOR (Mar. 6, 2003), http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/evidence.html.
122 Byrd v. State, 593 N.E.2d 1183, 1187 (Ind. 1992).  The “profile” involved in
Byrd was the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory test, a personality test fre-
quently administered by psychologists. Id. at 1184.  In Byrd, the defendant attempted
to admit his MMPI test results in order to show his character was inconsistent with
committing intentional murder. Id.
123 Id. at 1187 (“Indiana generally permits evidence of a defendant’s good charac-
ter to be proven only by testimony about his reputation in the community.”).
124 State v. Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329, 331 (Iowa 1992).
125 Id. at 332–33.
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that “[t]he question boils down to whether the evidence would aid the
jury in its decision-making role.”126  There, the court held that it was
within the trial court’s discretion to exclude the evidence.127
In both cases, the holdings may be correct, but the reasoning is
unsatisfactory.  Each court seemed to acknowledge that profile and
syndrome evidence raises a character inference, yet did not suggest
how it could be properly introduced.  Their struggle is unsurprising.
The Federal Rules of Evidence and corresponding state rules simply
do not provide an adequate solution to the Rule 405 problem.
III. THE CONFUSED APPROACHES OF FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS IN
ANALYZING PROFILE AND SYNDROME EVIDENCE
The Federal Rules are of course uniform across the federal cir-
cuits.  Moreover, thirty-eight states have adopted evidence codes cor-
responding to the Federal Rules.128  Yet the courts’ treatment of
profile and syndrome evidence is far from uniform.  The variety of
approaches demonstrates that the Federal Rules and corresponding
state rules do not adequately address such evidence.
A. The Majority View
A majority of jurisdictions considering profile and syndrome evi-
dence analyze it exclusively under Rules 401, 403, and 702.129  That is,
they do not even acknowledge that the evidence may raise a character
inference.130
Like all evidence, profile and syndrome evidence must be rele-
vant under Rule 401 and admissible under the Rule 403 balancing
126 Id. at 333.  The court also held that the proposed testimony “clearly goes
beyond ordinary character evidence.  It comes cloaked with an aura of scientific relia-
bility about the predisposition of certain individuals to commit the type of crime at
issue.” Id.  It was more objectionable because of the prohibition in Iowa of experts
offering an opinion on the ultimate question of guilt. Id.
127 Id.
128 See Cornell U. Law Sch. Legal Info. Inst., supra note 121.
129 See, e.g., United States v. King, 703 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1067–75 (D. Haw. 2010);
United States v. Brown, 891 F. Supp. 1501, 1505 (D. Kan. 1995).
130 Perhaps this is by necessity, because of the Rule 405 problem and the pre-
scribed methods of proving character.  If one reads the approved methods as being
exclusive, profile and syndrome evidence would never be admissible, because it does
not fall within any of the categories.  Under this view, one must ignore the character
inference and Rule 404 in order for the evidence to ever be admitted.
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test.  Relevance depends on the purpose for which the evidence is
offered.131
Even if profile and syndrome evidence is generally admissible in
the jurisdiction, it must be offered for a relevant purpose.132  For
instance, the defendant in United States v. Taylor133 was accused of con-
spiracy to defraud the Department of Motor Vehicles.134  Investigators
had recorded incriminating conversations of the defendant in her
apartment.135  As part of her defense, she planned to deny any recol-
lection of these conversations.136  The court held that it would admit
Battered Woman Syndrome evidence as relevant and admissible for
the limited purpose of explaining her memory loss, and thus rehabili-
tate her credibility when the government attacked it.137  It suggested,
however, that evidence that showed generally that the defendant was
abused would be limited by Rule 403, because “the danger of unfair
prejudice to the government arising out of the jury’s natural tendency
to sympathize with Taylor as a battered woman (thereby perhaps
prompting the jury to refrain from punishing her further by its ver-
dict) is manifest.”138
If the evidence meets the standards of Rule 401 and Rule 403, the
court must then consider the expert testimony requirements of Arti-
cle 7.  Because evidence of the syndrome is presented through expert
testimony, courts simply examine whether the evidence will assist the
131 See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note (“Relevancy is not an inherent
characteristic of any item of evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of
evidence and a matter properly provable in the case.”).
132 See Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2005).  In 1993, Lyle and
Erik Menendez were convicted of murdering their parents. Id. at 1025.  At trial, the
brothers admitted to shotgunning their parents to death, but claimed they had been
driven to commit the crime by a lifetime of abuse and fear of their parents. Id. at
1024.  The trial judge refused to admit expert testimony that the brothers fit the pro-
file of “battered persons.” Id. at 1030–31.  Couching the issue narrowly, the court
stated that only evidence which corroborated the defendant’s state of mind at the
time of the killing was relevant. Id. at 1031.  The trial judge stated, “[i]t’s really irrele-
vant, and it would be totally irrelevant to any trial, that the defendants had been
abused or that they fit a particular diagnosis of being abused.  That’s totally irrelevant,
unless it corroborates their testimony as to their mental state at the time of the crime.
If it doesn’t do that, then the fact that they happen to be abused or happen to fit a
particular diagnosis is irrelevant.” Id. (emphasis removed).
133 820 F. Supp. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
134 Id. at 125.
135 Id. at 126.
136 Id. at 128.
137 Id. (“[B]attered woman syndrome may, in appropriate circumstances, be
offered to counter attacks upon a witness’s credibility.”).
138 Id. at 127.
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trier of fact in understanding an issue, and whether the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods.139  The Court in Tay-
lor began by observing that the Battered Woman Syndrome is suffi-
ciently recognized by the present state of scientific knowledge to
permit the admission of expert opinion testimony.140  Assuming Rule
702’s standards for expert opinions are met, courts in a majority of
jurisdictions will admit the evidence.141
B. The “Group Character Evidence” View
Some jurisdictions have acknowledged that profile and syndrome
evidence may raise a character inference.142  These courts admit the
evidence as long as the inference does not relate to the criminal
defendant’s guilt or innocence.  However, these jurisdictions do not
address how the evidence can properly be offered under Rule 405 or
otherwise.143
In McMillan, prosecutors in Ohio attempted to use profile evi-
dence of sexual offenders to prove that the defendant was more likely
to have committed sexual abuse.144  After establishing that the defen-
dant had been abused in the past, the prosecution called a detective
as an expert witness to testify regarding the profile of sexual offend-
ers.145  The following exchange occurred at trial:
Q.  Have the seminars [which the detective attended] addressed any
common characteristics among offenders or victims?
139 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 891 F. Supp. 1501, 1506 (D. Kan. 1995).
140 Taylor, 820 F. Supp. at 127.
141 See, e.g., Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1241 (8th Cir. 1991)
(allowing Battered Woman Syndrome evidence to be presented by either party so
long as it meets the standards of Rule 702); United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417,
419 (8th Cir. 1987) (allowing an expert to testify as to certain traits and characteristics
of sexually abused children as compared with those exhibited by alleged victim
because it would assist the jury); Brown, 891 F. Supp. at 1508 (allowing Battered
Woman Syndrome evidence presented by an expert because it would assist the trier of
fact in determining the accused’s state of mind and whether she acted as she did
because the accused threatened or abused her); Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 496
(Ind. 1995) (“The reliability of syndrome evidence, although highly questionable for
purposes of affirmatively proving sexual abuse, is generally accepted for purposes of
helping the jury to understand that a complainant’s reactions are not atypical of a
young sexual assault victim.”).
142 See, e.g., State v. McMillan, 590 N.E.2d 23, 32 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (“Another
complicating factor in the use of profile testimony is that, by expert opinion, charac-
ter evidence is presented to the jury.”).
143 See supra Part II.
144 McMillan, 590 N.E.2d at 23.
145 Id. at 31.
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A.  There’s one thing that they have in common.
MR. LUCAS: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, overruled.  Go ahead.
A.  Normally, in 85 to 90 percent of the cases, an offender was also a
victim earlier in his or her life.
Q.  And have you, in the approximately 300 investigations that you
have personally been involved with, have you found that characteris-




A.  It’s about 85 to 90 percent of the time.146
In reversing the conviction, the Ohio Court of Appeals labeled
profile evidence of sexual abusers “group character evidence.”147
Group character evidence attempts “to prove that because other persons
have acted in certain ways in the past, a defendant who shares com-
mon characteristics with those persons is likely to have acted the same
way with respect to the crime charged.”148  The court further stated
that “ ‘group’ character evidence is objectionable for the same reason
as is traditional character evidence: probative value depends upon the
jury drawing the forbidden inference that the defendant has a pro-
pensity to commit the crime with which he is charged.”149  There, the
court completely barred the use of such evidence because it was too
unreliable and prejudicial to a criminal defendant.150
However, the same Ohio Court of Appeals allows the use of pro-
file evidence if the inference raised does not relate specifically to a
defendant’s guilt or propensity to commit a crime.  In one case, the
court allowed an expert to testify about Rape Trauma Syndrome to
explain why the victim delayed reporting being raped.151  In admitting
the testimony, the court noted that the expert doctor testified that he
had never met the defendant, and did not give an opinion as to
whether she was raped or was telling the truth.152
146 Id.
147 Id. at 32.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. (“[G]roup character evidence of sexual abusers, at this time, is so unrelia-
ble and prejudicial that it should not be used even when the defendant puts his char-
acter in issue.”).
151 State v. Moore, No. 1736, 1989 WL 21233, at *5–7 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 8,
1989), dismissed, 541 N.E.2d 623 (1989).
152 Moore, 1989 WL 21233, at *7.
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Similarly, the court allowed an expert social worker to testify
about evidence similar to Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syn-
drome to explain why a sexually abused child might change his or her
story.153  The testimony at trial proceeded as follows:
Q. The last 10 years you worked with children who have been sexu-
ally abused?
A. Yes.
Q. Of the children that you have worked with, how many have been
able to tell you the entire story the first time you have seen them?
MR. ALLEN: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.  He is asking for a percentage.
A. Approximately—well, I’d say maybe 50 percent . . . .
. . . .
Q. So, of the kids that you have dealt with, 50 percent of those kids
haven’t been able to tell you the entire story?
A. That is correct.
Q. In your first meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there any reason that you know of for that?
MR. ALLEN: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.  Go ahead.
A. The traumatic experience itself is . . . outside the scope of the
child’s ability to comprehend exactly what has happened to him or
her; and, consequently, because the mind acts as a buffer for
trauma, they will bury things; or it’s too painful to bring up or to
talk about right then.  So, it isn’t always uppermost in their minds to
talk about.154
Again, the expert did not testify whether she believed the victim’s
story.155  Moreover, the purpose of the testimony, the court noted, was
merely to address the credibility of children who had been abused,
rather than to show the child in that case was abused or was telling the
truth.156
The use of Drug Courier Profile evidence has also been admitted
for limited purposes, despite the court’s acknowledgment that it may
153 State v. McMillan, 577 N.E.2d 91, 94–95 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).  The two McMil-
lan cases are unrelated.
154 Id. at 94.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 94–95.
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raise a character inference.  In United States v. Doe,157 an expert testi-
fied that heroin is frequently smuggled into the U.S. through Niger-
ian traffickers, often through small cities.158  He further explained
that traffickers usually use the mailing addresses of other individuals
to receive imported heroin, and often assume false identities.159  The
defendant and the facts and circumstances surrounding his arrest fit
the profile.160  The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s deci-
sion to admit the expert testimony, because while it could raise a
group character inference, it was permissible for the purpose it was
offered.161  Rather than suggesting that the defendant had a propen-
sity to smuggle drugs, the Court reasoned that the evidence merely
demonstrated the modus operandi of Nigerian traffickers of her-
oin.162  However, the court noted that it was “sympathetic” to the
group character argument, and declared that “[i]f the only purpose of
profile evidence is to support an inference of guilt by association, then
an objection to the evidence would be well-founded.”163
C. The Irrelevance View
Still other courts have dismissed profile evidence as completely
irrelevant.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts prohibited
the use of Battering Parent Profile164 evidence partially on these
grounds.165  It reasoned, “[t]estimony regarding a criminal profile is
nothing more than an expert’s opinion as to certain characteristics
which are common to some or most of the individuals who commit
particular crimes.  Evidence of a ‘child battering profile’ does not
meet the relevancy test, because the mere fact that a defendant fits the
profile does not tend to prove that a particular defendant physically
abused the victim.”166  However, given the remarkably low standard
for relevance—whether the evidence has any tendency to make a fact
157 149 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 1998).
158 Id. at 636.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 635–36.
161 Id. at 637–38.
162 Id. at 638 (“Far from suggesting that Doe had a ‘propensity’ to import or dis-
tribute drugs—as, for instance, a dishonest person might have a propensity to lie, or a
hot-tempered person might have a propensity to throw the first punch—Balbo’s testi-
mony served only to illuminate the modus operandi of Nigerian importers of Southeast
Asian heroin.”).
163 Id. at 638.
164 What the Court refers to as the “child battering profile” is more commonly
known as the Battering Parent Profile.
165 Commonwealth v. Day, 569 N.E.2d 397, 399–400 (Mass. 1991).
166 Id.  See also State v. Maule, 667 P.2d 96, 98–99 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
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more or less probable than it would be without the evidence—this
view is unconvincing.
D. The Wisconsin View
As discussed above, the vast majority of jurisdictions analyze pro-
file and syndrome evidence under the general relevancy rules, Rules
401–403 and the rules governing experts, Rules 701–703.167  The State
of Wisconsin takes a different position.  Recognizing that profiles and
syndromes often raise a character inference, Wisconsin courts cor-
rectly analyze the evidence under Rule 404.
Wisconsin’s battle over the admissibility of profile and syndrome
evidence began with State v. Richard A.P.168  The defendant Richard
was convicted of sexual contact with a minor.  At trial, he sought the
admission of expert testimony for the purpose of showing that he did
not exhibit character traits consistent with a sexual disorder such as
pedophilia.169  A psychologist who had evaluated the defendant would
have testified that his sexual history and responses to testing about his
sexual behavior did not show any evidence of pedophilia or any other
diagnosable sexual disorder.  The doctor would have further testified
that absent a diagnosable disorder, it is unlikely that such a person
would molest a child.170  In reversing the trial court’s decision to
exclude the evidence, the Wisconsin Appellate Court held that the
evidence was relevant and admissible character evidence.  The court did
not craft a specific rule which would govern sexual deviancy profile
evidence.  Rather, it simply applied the general rules governing expert
testimony and character evidence.171  Expert opinion relevance
depends on whether the evidence will assist the trier of fact in deter-
mining a fact in issue.  Character evidence allows the defendant to
present evidence of his own pertinent character traits in the form of
reputation or opinion.  Under both rules, the evidence was admissi-
ble.172  The court did not address the Rule 405 problem.
The State of Wisconsin has subsequently fought to overturn Rich-
ard A.P. decision.  The defendant in State v. Davis173 had been
167 See supra Parts III.A–C.
168 589 N.W.2d 674 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
169 Id. at 682.
170 Id. at 680.
171 The court concluded that the evidence was admissible under WIS. STAT.
§ 907.02, the rule governing expert testimony, and WIS. STAT. § 904.04(1)(a), the rule
governing character evidence. Richard A.P., 589 N.W.2d at 681.
172 Id. at 681–83.
173 645 N.W.2d 913 (Wis. 2002).
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charged with repeated sexual assault of a child.174  At trial, his
attempts to introduce Richard A.P. evidence were denied.175  During
his appeal, the government lawyers asked the state supreme court to
adopt a blanket restriction on Richard A.P. evidence.176  The court
declined to do so.177  Instead, it held that the defendant’s expert
should have been allowed to testify to the general character traits of
sexual offenders, his findings on whether the defendant possessed
those character traits, and his ultimate opinion on the likelihood that
Davis committed the sexual assault at issue.178  In doing so, the state
supreme court admonished the lower court to “closely scrutinize such
evidence, . . . for its relevancy, its probative value, and its potential for
danger of unfair prejudice or confusion to the jury.”179  In other
words, profile and syndrome evidence must be closely analyzed under
Rule 403.
The dissent in Davis “reluctantly” agreed with the decision to
admit Richard A.P. evidence here and in other sexual assault cases, but
would have restricted the general use of profile evidence.180  The dis-
sent emphasized the unique nature of many sexual assault trials,
which typically lack neutral witnesses and any physical evidence.181  As
such, profile evidence may be extremely valuable to the defense’s
case.  However, he argued that use of character profile evidence
should not be extended to other, non-sexual assault trials, noting that
widespread use of this evidence “potentially emasculates the evidence
code’s rule that character evidence is not admissible for the purpose
of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on a particu-
lar occasion.”182
Importantly, Richard A.P. and Davis do not mandate the admission
of sexual offense profile evidence.  The judge must still conduct a gen-
eral relevancy balancing test.  The Wisconsin rule of evidence is nearly
identical to the Federal Rule, asserting that “[a]lthough relevant, evi-
dence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
174 Id. at 917.
175 Id. at 918.
176 The dissent defined Richard A.P. evidence as “expert testimony based on an
examination of the defendant, concluding that the defendant lacks the personality
characteristics of a sexual offender and is, therefore, unlikely to have committed the
alleged sexual assault.” See id. at 929 (Crooks, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 920 (majority opinion).
178 Id. at 920.
179 Id. at 917.
180 Id. at 928 (Crooks, J., dissenting).
181 Id.
182 Id.
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misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”183  Despite
the Rule’s pro-admissibility tenor, courts may properly exercise their
discretion and exclude Richard A.P. evidence.
In State v. Walters,184 a Wisconsin trial court again excluded
expert testimony regarding the traits of sexual abusers of children.185
Government lawyers continued to argue vehemently against such testi-
mony, declaring that “[o]bviously Richard A.P. is a wrong decision and
contrary to precedent nationwide.”186  This time the Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld the decision to exclude the evidence, but did
not overrule or limit Richard A.P.  The court distinguished the prof-
fered testimony in Walters from that of Richard A.P. and Davis.  There,
a period of six years had passed since the alleged assaults had taken
place and the defendant was evaluated—a much longer gap than in
Richard A.P. and Davis.187  Furthermore, the defendant had been an
alcoholic during most of the period, but no longer was when he was
evaluated.188  The defendant’s expert had indicated that the test
results can be altered by alcohol consumption, and admitted that her
test results did not take into account whether the defendant’s behav-
ior was triggered by alcohol consumption.189  This reduced the proba-
tive value of her testimony enough for the Wisconsin Supreme Court
to find that a reasonable judge could exclude the evidence.190 How-
183 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 904.03 (West 2011).
184 675 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 2004).
185 Id. at 785–86 (“The circuit court conducted such a balancing test and consid-
ered the potential for the confusion of the issues, and its propensity to mislead the
jury.  The court stated that the proffered evidence would be inappropriately ‘lengthy’
and ‘wandering’ and would ‘obscure’ the real issue of witness credibility.”).
186 Id. at 781.
187 Id. at 786.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.  The Wisconsin and Ohio courts appear to have opposite views on profile
testimony specific to the defendant.  The expert in Walters would not have offered any
conclusions specific to the defendant’s propensity to commit sexual assault.  She testi-
fied: “What I’ve done is assess Mr. Walters’ personality so that the finder of fact can
look at it.  And I can talk about what kind of personality child sexual abusers are more
likely to have.  But clearly you are always going to have some people who aren’t child
abusers who have the same kind of problems and you are going to find some child
abusers who don’t have them, but it’s a matter of probability.  These are characteris-
tics found more often in child sexual abusers, and I can talk about those.” Id.  The
Court viewed the generality of the testimony as cutting against admissibility—because
such evidence was less probative, rather than tilting toward admissibility—because
such evidence is more prejudicial. Id.  The Courts in the McMillan cases resolved the
issue the opposite way.  Evidence specific to the defendant was too prejudicial to
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ever, Richard A.P. remains the law in Wisconsin. If testimony discuss-
ing the personality characteristics of sexual abusers satisfies Rule 403,
the evidence is generally admissible.
IV. THE NEED FOR REEXAMINATION
A. Profile and Syndrome Evidence Should be Analyzed under Rule 404
The variety of different approaches taken by courts in admitting
profile and syndrome evidence demonstrates the need for clarity.
Most jurisdictions recognize that profile and syndrome evidence is
helpful to explain a victim’s or witness’s actions.  They similarly recog-
nize that demonstrating that a criminal defendant fits a profile of
“bad men” to prove conduct is highly prejudicial.  That said, the
broad disregard for the inference raised by profile and syndrome evi-
dence—even if offered for a different purpose—is troubling.
One solution is for courts to reexamine profile and syndrome evi-
dence under the existing Federal Rules.  Courts should acknowledge,
as the Wisconsin courts do, that profile and syndrome evidence raises
a character inference,191 and craft approaches based on that fact.
Rule 404 concerns should be considered any time profile or syndrome
evidence is offered.  Such an approach would not prohibit the use of
profile and syndrome evidence, but would limit its use.
Three important consequences would emerge from such a
change:
(1) The use of profile and syndrome evidence would be greatly
reduced in civil cases.
(2) Profile and syndrome evidence would only be admissible
against a criminal defendant if it falls under one of the exceptions
in Rule 404(a)(2).
(3) Profile and syndrome evidence supporting a witness’s credibility
would be admissible only if the witness’s character for truthfulness
has been attacked.
First, because character evidence is only admissible in criminal
matters, or when character is in issue in a civil case, the use of profile
admit, while general conclusions were admissible. See supra notes 142–156 and R
accompanying text.
191 See, e.g., Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 499 (Ind. 1995) (“Where a jury is
confronted with evidence of an alleged child victim’s behaviors, paired with expert
testimony concerning similar syndrome behaviors, the invited inference—that the
child was sexually abused because he or she fits the syndrome profile—will be as
potentially misleading and equally as unreliable as expert testimony applying the syn-
drome to the facts of the case and stating outright the conclusion that a given child
was abused.”).
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and syndrome evidence will be greatly reduced in civil cases.192
Arguably, such a prohibition deprives the jury of valuable evidence
which would assist its decision making. However, the drafters of Rule
404 decided that such evidence, while probative, is unduly prejudicial.
As the Supreme Court in Michelson v. United States aptly explained,
“[t]he overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admit-
ted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance
tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue
prejudice.”193  Treating profile and syndrome evidence as this Note
has suggested merely extends the existing rule prohibiting character
evidence in civil cases.
Second, with Rule 404 as the filter, profile and syndrome evi-
dence should only be admissible against a criminal defendant if it falls
under one of the exceptions listed in Rule 404.  The Federal Rules
recognize that criminal defendants should be able to present compel-
ling evidence to support their innocence, and that danger of
prejudice forbids certain kinds of evidence from being introduced
against them.  Under the Rule 404 framework, a defendant must first
offer evidence of a pertinent trait.194  For instance, a criminal defen-
dant could offer evidence that he does not possess qualities consistent
with a Battering Parent Profile or Sexual Offender Profile.  Then, and
only then, could the prosecutor offer evidence—in the form of profile
and syndrome or otherwise—to rebut this evidence.195
Under Rule 404, which refers to Rule 608 when addressing the
character of a witness, profile and syndrome evidence supporting a
witness’s credibility is admissible only if the witness’s character for
truthfulness has been attacked.196  Evidence tending to explain a vic-
192 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404:2, at 354–56
(5th ed. 2001) (“Circumstantial use of character evidence is not permitted in civil
cases . . . except to impeach or support the character of a witness for truthfulness as
provided for in Rules 607, 608 and 609.”).
193 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948).
194 See 2A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & PETER J. HENNING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 409, at 97 (4th ed. 2009) (“[T]he rule is entirely settled that unless and until
the accused gives evidence of good character, the prosecution may not introduce evi-
dence intended to show that he or she is a person of bad character.”).
195 Id. at 98–99, 101 (“By offering such evidence, defendant, in the courtroom
phrase, ‘puts his character in issue.’ . . . If the defendant undertakes to show that his
or her character is good, the disability previously imposed on the prosecution is
removed, and it is now free to attack this evidence and prove that defendant’s charac-
ter is bad.”).
196 See FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (“A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported
by testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that character.  But
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tim’s behavior—such as Rape Trauma Syndrome or Battered Woman
Syndrome—would fall under this category.  In most cases, victims
would routinely be permitted to present this evidence, because a
defendant would almost certainly argue that the victim was lying.
Assuming the witness’s character for truthfulness was attacked, profile
and syndrome evidence could be used in rebuttal.197
B. Solving the Rule 405 Problem
The method of proving character through profile and syndrome
evidence remains unclear. Indeed, this demonstrates the weakness of
the Federal Rules in dealing with such evidence.  The evidence raises
a character inference, but Rule 405 does not envision an expert
presenting character evidence.
It is possible that Rule 405 can be interpreted as currently written
to allow—or at least not preclude—the introduction of profile and
syndrome evidence.  Two possible readings of the Rule could author-
ize an expert to present character evidence in some instances.
Though both require a somewhat strained interpretation of the Rule,
either is preferable to the current prevailing method of ignoring the
character inference invited by profile and syndrome evidence entirely.
1. Reading One: Rule 405 only applies to lay witnesses
A plausible reading of Rule 405 is that it is meant to only apply to
lay witnesses.  Rule 405 states, in relevant part: “When evidence of a
person’s character or character trait is admissible, it may be proved by
testimony about the person’s reputation or by testimony in the form
of an opinion.”  However, Rule 702 declares that an expert’s testi-
mony must be based on “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge.”198  The methods of proving character,
through opinion based on personal observation or general knowledge
of the person’s reputation in the community,199 seem to clearly con-
template a lay witness.
evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the witness’s character for truth-
fulness has been attacked.”).
197 See also 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE EVIDENCE § 6114, at 56 (1st ed. 1993) (“Since Rule 608(a) is not expressly
limited to lay opinions, it arguably overrules this common law and provides authority
for the admission of expert opinions as to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness.”).
198 FED. R. EVID. 702.
199 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, Student Edition § 186, at 312 (Broun ed., 6th ed.
2006).
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If Rule 405 only applies to lay witnesses, presumably only lay wit-
nesses are constrained by the prescribed methods of proving charac-
ter.  Thus, Rule 405 would not necessarily preclude an expert from
presenting character evidence through methods other than opinion,
reputation or specific instances of conduct.  An expert witness would
be free to present character evidence in any manner—including
through profiles and syndromes—within the trial court’s discretion.
However, focusing on the presenter of the testimony rather than
the testimony itself appears at odds with the text of the rule, which
makes no mention of the type of witness who may present such evi-
dence.200  The Rule “does not on its face distinguish between expert
and lay opinions.”201  Furthermore, there is no companion rule out-
lining methods of proving character by an expert witness. This sug-
gests either that Rule 405 encompasses all kinds of witnesses including
experts, or that expert witnesses may never present character evidence.
2. Reading Two: The methods of proving character in Rule 405
are not exhaustive
A related reading proposes that Rule 405 is not meant to encom-
pass every method of proving character.  Rule 405(a) states that char-
acter “may be proved by testimony about the person’s reputation or by
testimony in the form of an opinion.”202  The use of the word “may”
instead of “must” suggests that the Rule does not preclude proving
character by methods other than those listed.203  In other words, a lay
witness may prove character by opinion, but that does not prohibit an
expert from proving character through expert testimony under Rules
702–703.  Jurisdictions such as Wisconsin which acknowledge that
some profiles and syndromes raise an admissible character inference
seemingly embrace this interpretation, though none have expressly
addressed the Rule 405 problem.
Though far from ideal, a Court could properly read the permis-
sive language of Rule 405 as examples of permitted methods, rather
than treating it as an exhaustive list.  It requires a stretch—but not an
200 See FED. R. EVID. 405.
201 See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 5265, at 591 (concluding also that R
“it would be beyond the legitimate use of ‘interpretation’ to read the rule as admit-
ting only lay opinions of character”).
202 FED. R. EVID. 405(a) (emphasis added).
203 See FED. R. EVID. 101, advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment (“The
restyled rules replace ‘shall’ with ‘must,’ ‘may,’ or ‘should,’ depending on which one
the context and established interpretation make correct in each rule.”), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title28/html/USCODE-2011-title28-
app-federalru-dup2-rule101.htm.
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impermissible one—to conclude that Rule 405 authorizes experts to
testify on character issues.  At the very least, the Federal Rules do not
expressly prohibit the use of profile and syndrome evidence to prove
character.  Commentators have acknowledged that “there are other
ways of evidencing character that are difficult to fit into the scheme”
of Rule 405.204  While not a perfect solution, the text of Rule 405 per-
mits this alternative reading.
A far more preferable approach is for the Supreme Court to pro-
mulgate a new rule of evidence directly addressing profile and syn-
drome evidence.  A new rule should specifically identify the form of
evidence—a compilation of characteristics, coupled with an implicit
invitation to infer conduct from those characteristics—when such evi-
dence is admissible, and the acceptable methods of proving it.
A radical new approach is not necessary, nor desirable.  Instead, a
new Rule should be modeled after Rules 404 and 608.  The default
rule should be that profile and syndrome evidence is not admissible to
prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance
with the profile or syndrome.  Just as under Rule 404, it should
include a number of significant exceptions.  Criminal defendants have
the right to offer evidence of their own good character for the pur-
pose of proving it unlikely that they committed the crimes charged,
and a rule should reflect that.205  Once the “door is opened,” the pros-
ecution should be allowed to rebut such evidence with its own expert
testimony.  Similarly, when a victim or witness’s character for truthful-
ness is attacked, they should be permitted to present profile and syn-
drome evidence to rebut those attacks.  Just as importantly, a
companion Rule to Rule 405 should prescribe the acceptable methods
of proving character by an expert witness.
The rule prohibiting character evidence to show conduct “is so
deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence as to assume almost constitu-
tional proportions and to override doubts of the basic relevancy of the
evidence.”206  The majority of courts recognize that profile and syn-
drome evidence can be exceedingly valuable and helpful to a jury.
But contrary to the prevailing norm, such evidence should be admit-
ted only after a proper consideration of Rule 404 and 405.
204 See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 201, § 5262, at 565. R
205 See State v. Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Iowa 1992).
206 FED. R. EVID. 404, advisory committee’s note on proposed rules.
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